The Personal Identification Project

The cornerstone of the Personal Identification Project is that it changes the basis of the Passport Service's operations from document-centric to person-centric. In the past the Passport Office has kept track of passports, but the new model keeps track of people. PIP is intended to "provide the UKPS with the capability to verify the identity of passport applicants and holders by accessing commercial databases and those of other government departments, improving fraud detection and prevention by more detailed yet automated/rapid checks into applicants' attributed and biographical information. This provides an infrastructure for identity verification that can be used by other government departments via data presented by a private-sector partner" (UKPS Business plan 2005-10). ... The commercial "passport validation service" that exists at the moment in pilot form can't go much further than confirming that a passport is genuine, but the biographical data the UKPS is starting to compile from commercial sources, new applicants and the planned personal interviews will provide a much more solid identity verification system. The Government intends that UKPS forms the basis of a new agency to run the identity cards scheme and the National Identity Register, but it can be seen that as far as passports are concerned, the NIR is already under construction.

The step change the Passport Service's operation is undergoing becomes clearer if you look at it this way - in order to issue a passport, the Passport Service clearly has to ask sufficient questions to prove fairly conclusively that the applicant exists. However, in the future the Passport Service proposes to retain the answers to these questions and to build on them, producing a biographical narrative of that individual's continuing existence, OK? ...

...Passports are issued under Royal Prerogative, effectively executive powers of the monarch which are exercised by Government Ministers. These powers include the right to grant and revoke passports, exercised by the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary ... The Government did, last year, say that it could add fingerprints to passports via the Royal Prerogative, but as all of the Passport Service's identity-related plans are going ahead with or without the ID Card Bill, clearly it's all happening under the Prerogative.

[The Personal Identification Project] will involve the collection, sharing, and mining of information from a variety of sources, including other government departments and the private sector to protect against fraud.

Through the Personal Identification Project (PIP), we are piloting the use of data sharing with the private sector and other government departments, to strengthen identity authentication. Our pivotal role in the Identity Cards Programme will ensure we continue to work in partnership with others in government as well as with the private sector, using the latest proven technologies and application channels to deliver modern services that meet customer expectations. (p.14)

Roll out of Personal Identification Project (PIP) We are currently trialling the use of access to private- and public-sector databases at one office (with applicant consent), to assess the operational implications and whether identity authentication is strengthened. The outcomes of this pilot have informed a plan to roll out PIP to all offices on a limited basis (i.e. all first-time adult applicants) and explore integration into our standard processes. Changes in legislation may be required to make this scheme fully effective. (p.18)

Equifax has a contract with UKPS until 2007 to provide the systems and private-sector data for PIP. The effectiveness of PIP and plans for the future roll-out are currently under review. (p.34)

To provide the UKPS with the capability to verify the identity of passport applicants and holders by accessing commercial databases and those of other government departments. Improving fraud detection and prevention by more detailed yet automated/rapid checks into applicants’ attributed and biographical information. This provides an infrastructure for identity verification that can be used by other government departments via data presented by a private-sector partner. (p.37)

Such a scheme will likely face technological and legal challenges. Legally, the sharing of this information is not currently permitted. Technologically, it is very difficult to interface with a variety of government departments and the private sector on a massive scale. Combined, the accuracy and integrity of this information is highly questionable. It sounds increasingly as though the PS is establishing itself as the central guarantor of identity within the UK Government, which will also create political challenges.